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I. INTRODUCTION
Professional sports have enjoyed unique legal treatment since
their entry into the business community. Examples of such treat-
ment range from reticent enforcement of a contract between two
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boxers to baseball's blanket exemption from the antitrust laws.1
The rationale for such favored treatment appears inconsistent:
"[baseball's exemption] is an aberration that has been with us now
for half a century. . . [and] rests on a recognition and an accept-
ance of baseball's unique characteristics and needs."2 This incon-
sistent approach to sports industries creates confusion as to the
legal status of the various leagues'
A current area of legal dispute is in professional tennis. Since
1968, when prize money was first openly awarded to players, pro-
fessional tennis has grown into a 100 million dollar enterprise with
an ever-increasing entertainment market share.' This rapid growth
caused the evolution of professional tennis to be chaotic and cre-
ated a power vacuum.' Increased audiences, prizes, television reve-
nue and sponsorship contracts' created the need for some form of
representational framework. The structure came in the form of two
management companies, ProServ and International Management
Group (IMG).: These two organizations initially operated as agents
for athletes and eventually expanded into all aspects of the tennis
and sports industries. Ultimately, ProServ and IMG began pro-
moting and televising tournaments.
1. Compare Machen v. Johansson, 174 F. Supp. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (Boxing) with
Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972) (Baseball). The accommodating posture taken by the
courts and Congress produces legal inconsistencies such as decisions holding an owner's
agreement not to allow franchises to shift locations an antitrust violation while that same
owner's agreement forming the league is not. See Professional Sports Community Protec-
tion Act of 1985, Hearings on S. 259 and S. 287 Before the Senate Committee on Com-
merce, Science, and Transportation, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., [hereinafter Hearings].
2. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972).
3. Hearings, supra note 1, at 66-67 (statement of Pete Rozelle, Commissioner of the
National Football League).
4. Women's International Tennis Association Media Guide at 4 (1987) [hereinafter
WITA Media Guide]. Today's tennis industry involves over 15 million adult American ten-
nis players and spectators, with the penetration of equipment, apparel, clubs, and endorse-
ments affecting many facets of the American and world economies.
5. Lawyers Donald Dell and Mark McCormack positioned themselves on both sides of
the tennis bargaining table and propelled tennis into a dominant force in professional
sports.
6. Men's and women's professional tennis comprises 3,000 individuals playing in over
200 tournaments world-wide and competing for over 35 million dollars in prize money.
Men's International Professional Tennis Council, Official Yearbook at 5 (1987) [hereinafter
MIPTC Yearbook]; WITA Media Guide, supra note 4, at 4. Certain players, such as Jimmy
Connors, are capable of earning over five million dollars a year from endorsements alone.
Agins, Grudge Match: Big Tennis Has Turned Against Operator, and He Returns Favor,
Wall St. J., March 20, 1986, at 1, col. 1. Furthermore, although attendance at the U.S. Open
has doubled in the last eleven years, the broadcast rights to the tournament have generated
250 times the fees generated at the beginning of that period. TENNIS WEEK, Oct. 3, 1985, at
2.
7. Donald Dell founded ProServ and Mark McCormack founded IMG.
[Vol. 4:57
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A problem arose because these companies represented players
with whom they would contract to appear in their own tourna-
ments, which were then broadcast by the companies' television
production divisions.8 Concern over this problem was raised by
several tennis organizations.' Ultimately, the Men's International
Professional Tennis Council (the Council) passed a conflict of in-
terest rule which restricted concurrent representation of players
while promoting, managing or broadcasting tournaments. 10 The
implementation of this rule was challenged in a lawsuit by ProServ
and IMG. The action alleged that the regulation was an agreement
in restraint of free trade and accordingly violated the Federal Anti-
trust laws. In response, the Council charged both ProServ and
IMG with monopolistic practices."
This article will critically examine the legal structure support-
ing the business of sports. This analysis will first detail the evolu-
tion of the sport of tennis and will then outline the antitrust laws
and their specific application to sports industries. The application
of these antitrust principles to professional tennis will reveal cer-
tain inconsistencies in the current analytical model. Finally, this
article will proffer a framework for future analysis using an inter-
nally consistent and legally sound paradigm. 2
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE GAME
A. Early History
In 1874, Major Walter Clopton Wingfield of Great Britain ap-
plied for a patent, the subject of which would come to be known as
8. Interestingly, Dell was also the founder of and legal counsel for the men's players
association, the Association of Tennis Professionals (ATP), placing him truly on all sides of
the table; a financially beneficial position for Dell, yet a legally suspect one from the player's
perspective.
9. Alfano, Control of Men's Tennis at Issue in Suits, N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1985, at §
5, p. 6, col. 3.
10. Supplement #1, MIPTC Yearbook, supra note 6.
11. Volvo N. Am. Corp. v. Men's Int'l Prof. Tennis Council, No. 85 Civ. 2959
(KTD)(S.D.N.Y. filed April 17, 1985).
12. This article does not purport to examine the broad philosophical underpinnings of
the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement. It does utilize CLS mechanisms to address the
tennis antitrust issue and determine the soundness of continuted application of traditional
antitrust issues to this issue. For deeper discussions of the CLS movement, see generally
Kennedy & Klare, A Bibliography of Critical Legal Studies, 94 YALE L. J. 461 (1984); Criti-
cal Legal Studies Symposium, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984); Symposium on Critical Legal
Studies, 6 CARDozo L. REV. 693 (1985); Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96
HARV. L. REV. 563 (1983); Fischl, Some Realism About Critical Legal Studies, 41 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 505 (1987).
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"lawn tennis. '1 3 The sport grew in popularity among the elite. In
1900, in an effort to foster international competition, Dwight Filley
Davis created the Davis Cup.' 4 The International Tennis Federa-
tion (ITF) was formed shortly thereafter with twelve countries as
charter members, with each sending a delegate to the federation."
During the years that followed, four major international tourna-
ments developed, collectively known as the Grand Slam.' 6 These
major tournaments, as well as most other tournaments, were ama-
teur events and continued to be until 1968, when the ITF created
open events where both amateurs and professionals could com-
pete.17 This change produced an increase in the number of tourna-
ments with prize money, and enhanced the development of the
World Championship Tennis (WCT) tour, which a year earlier had
staged a series of smaller professional events.18
In 1970, the ITF created its own professional tour called the
Grand Prix circuit, which included the Grand Slam events. 9 Simi-
larly, the WCT developed its own smaller tour out of its original
events with a championship in Dallas."0 Although these tours were
independently operated at various times in the past, the WCT
events are currently integrated within the Grand Prix circuit.2
In 1972, the players formally organized as the Association of
Tennis Professionals (ATP). At approximately the same time, the
ITF formed a committee, consisting of three members each from
the ITF and ATP, to operate its growing Grand Prix circuit. The
enormous task of running the professional circuit overwhelmed the
committee, and the Council was formed to provide an indepen-
dent, democratic, international body for the administration of pro-
13. MIPTC Yearbook, supra note 6, at 6. Major Wingfield labeled his new game
"Sphairistike," a Greek term meaning "ball game". This term never did catch on.
14. Id.
15. Id. Originally named the International Lawn Tennis Federation, "Lawn" was de-
leted from the name in the late 1960's.
16. The four Grand Slam events are the Australian Open, the French Open, Wimble-
don, and the U. S. Open.
17. MIPTC Yearbook, supra note 6, at 7. In these open events, a player could accept
prize money without jeopardizing his standing to compete in the Grand Slam events.
18. See id. at 6-7. The WCT was the vision of Dave Dixon and Lamar Hunt, who
signed the "Handsome Eight" to exclusive professional contracts. The "Handsome Eight"
were Butch Buchholz, Pierre Barthes, Cliff Drysdale, John Newcombe, Nikki Pilic, Tony
Roche, Dennis Ralston and Rodger Taylor. Id.
19. Pepsi-Cola was the first overall sponsor of the Grand Prix circuit and was followed
by Commercial Union Assurance, Colgate-Palmolive, and Volvo. The current Grand Prix
sponsor is Nabisco. The present litigation among the MIPTC, IMG, and ProServ was actu-
ally commenced by Volvo when the MIPTC chose Nabisco to sponsor the circuit.
20. MIPTC Yearbook, supra note 6, at 7.
21. Id.
[Vol. 4:57
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fessional tennis.2 2 The original council had six members. In 1976,
the addition of three representatives of tournament owners in-
creased the size of the council to nine.2
B. Current State of the Game
The Council currently sanctions and schedules tournaments,
drafts and administers rules, provides tournament supervisors and
trains officials.2 From the Council's inception, there has been an
overall circuit sponsor for the Grand Prix. Sponsorship money is
paid to the Council in exchange for having the sponsor's corporate
name and product associated with each event. The players receive
the bulk of this sponsorship revenue through a bonus point system
for participating in Grand Prix events.25
Professional tennis events are either sanctioned by the Council
or are special events outside the Council's jurisdiction. Special
Events can vary from a one-night exhibition match to a two week
multi-player eliminations tournament.2 6 In 1986, there were sev-
enty-five sanctioned Grand Prix events and even more special
events scheduled world-wide.
From an organizational point of view, the typical tennis event
has many nonplaying participants giving the event a hybrid struc-
ture. The first participant is the owner, who undertakes the finan-
cial risk and makes the decision whether to seek Council sanction-ing.7 The manager of each event is responsible for the operational
components of the tournament, including the sale of tickets, adver-
tising, housing players, scheduling matches, hiring officials, and se-
22. Id. at 7-8. The ITF was created as a governing body to provide for uniform play in
the game of tennis. The operation of a professional circuit proved to be beyond the scope of
the organization. Id.
23. Id. Although the focus of this article is on men's professional tennis, the issues
addressed herein are identical for women's tennis as well. The histories of men's and
women's professional tennis parallel one another. The formation of the Women's Players
Association and later the Women's International Tennis Players Association (WITA) (for-
merly called the Women's Tennis Association) exemplify this similarity. Additionally, there
is a Women's International Professional Tennis Council (WIPTC) structured similarly to
the MIPTC.
24. Answer and Counterclaim, Volvo N. Am. Corp. v. Men's Int'l Prof. Tennis Council,
No. 85 Civ. 2959 (KTD) (S.D.N.Y. filed November 6, 1985).
25. Id. at 12.
26. Id.
27. MIPTC sanctioning of an event allows players to receive bonus points for their
play in the event. When totalled at the end of the year, the players with the highest total
points receive further prize monies from the MIPTC. Thus, sanctioning is sought by tourna-
ment owners to attract name players to their tournaments. MIPTC Yearbook, supra note 6,
at 88.
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lecting wild card player entries. There is also a merchandising
agent who is responsible for soliciting merchandisers and securing
the title sponsor, the presenting sponsor, and the various sub-spon-
sors.28 Finally, there is a television agent responsible for negotiat-
ing broadcast rights on a nation by nation and market by market
basis, 9 as well as securing a production company to handle the
telecast and commentary.
Players enter tournaments either by qualification or invita-
tion. The ATP is responsible for the computer ranking of individ-
ual players, which permits players ranked at a certain level direct
entry into tournaments. Lower ranked players may be required to
play in preliminary qualification rounds. As a player becomes suc-
cessful he will sign with an agent who is traditionally responsible
for negotiating the player's appearances, endorsements and provid-
ing financial consultation.3
As professional tennis evolved, agent organizations became in-
volved with the promotion and management of tournaments. As a
consequence, legal questions arose from the intertwined relation-
ship involving ProServ's representation of players appearing in
tournaments owned and broadcasted by ProServ. As a result, the
Council passed a "conflicts of interest" rule, precluding the owner,
manager, or broadcaster of a tournament from representing play-
ers. 1 The Council also proposed a "special event" rule which
would require all owners or managers of Grand Prix events to re-
frain from promoting any exhibitions during the same week as any
Grand Prix event.32 Because Grand Prix events occupy forty-eight
of the fifty-two weeks of the year, and exhibitions are primarily
promoted by Grand Prix event owners, exhibitions would be virtu-
ally eliminated."3
These two rules formed the basis for ProServ's antitrust action
against the Council. The Council counterclaimed asserting anti-
28. Answer and Counterclaim, Volvo N. Am. Corp. v. Men's Int'l Prof. Tennis Council,
No. 85 Civ. 2959 (KTD) (S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 6, 1985), at 15.
29. The size and scope of international television's influence on the sports industries
raises such issues as the difficulty of partitioning pay television home video from syndicated
television from over-the-air broadcasts, because each of these generates identifiable revenue.
See generally Cryan, Crane & Marcil, The Future of Sports Broadcasting: An International
Question, 10 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 213, 215, (1987).
30. Answer and Counterclaim, Volvo N. Am. Corp. v. Men's Int'l Prof. Tennis Council,
No. 85 Civ. 2959 (KTD) (S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 6, 1985), at 18.
31. Supplement #1, MIPTC Yearbook, supra note 6.
32. Id.
33. See Parcelle, ProServ's Center Court Conflict, AM. LAW., Oct. 1985, at 132.
[Vol. 4:57
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trust violations inherent in the dual roles of agent and owner. 4 An
interesting legal issue arises as to whether this area will receive
such special treatment as baseball because this is the first applica-
tion of antitrust law to the tennis industry.
III. DEVELOPMENT OF SPORTS ANTITRUST LAW
A. Origin and Application of the Sherman Act
Since its enactment in 1890, the Sherman Act (the Act)3  has
been the basic antitrust legislation in this country.3 6 The Act pro-
hibits "[e]very contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in re-
straint of trade or commerce among the several states,"3 7 as well as
limiting attempts and efforts to extend a monopoly.3" Though
heavily debated, the overall goal of the Act was to maximize con-
sumer welfare by producing the most economically efficient mar-
ketplace.39 The stated purpose of the Act is the promotion of com-
petition and the inhibition of restraints upon freedom of trade.4 0
When Congress passed the Act, it left determination of the
meaning and scope of the language to the courts."' The initial judi-
cial reaction to the Act can only be described as extreme. The Act
was first emasculated by an unrealistically narrow reading;42 subse-
quently, it was applied so rigidly as to render it unworkable unless
broad exceptions were allowed. 3
34. The counterclaim also alleges a multitude of conflict of interest questions. See in-
fra note 199 and accompanying text.
35. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
36. L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST 13 (1977).
37. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
38. Id. at § 2.
39. Graver, Recognition of the National Football League as a Single Entity Under
Section 1 of the Sherman Act: Implications of the Consumer Welfare Model, 82 MICH. L.
REV. 1, 7 (1983),
40. Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958). The Court stated
that
[t]he Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic lib-
erty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It
rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will
yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest
quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an
environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic political and social
institutions.
Id. at 4.
41. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 312 (1897).
42. In United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897), the United
States Supreme Court interpreted the language of the Sherman Act literally, holding both
reasonable and unreasonable restraints of trade illegal.
43. United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898).
1987]
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The Supreme Court recognized that the Act "cannot mean
what it says.""' Congress could not have intended the courts to de-
clare unlawful "every" contract that restrains competition.45 Aware
of the practical difficulty in literal application of the Act, Justice
Brandeis noted that "the legality of an agreement or regulation
cannot be determined by so simple a test.' 46 Every agreement con-
cerning trade, every commercial contract, every regulation of trade,
could be viewed as a restraint of trade. The true test of legality is
whether the imposed restraint only regulates and thereby possibly
promotes competition or whether it may suppress or even destroy
competition. 7 The evolution of the Act reflects the understanding
that only unreasonable restraints of trade are illegal.'8
1. THE RULE OF REASON
In 1911, the Supreme Court expanded the analysis of the Act
in the landmark case of Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United
States"9 by establishing the "rule of reason." In Standard Oil,
common stockholders of a number of petroleum companies affili-
ated with Standard Oil sought to consolidate their holdings under
44. National Soc. of Prof. Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687 (1978).
45. This gradual evolution away from a literal reading of § 1 of the Sherman Act be-
gan with United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898). The court struck down a
railroad cartel and distinguished between arrangements that directly and immediately re-
duced competition and those arrangements that only indirectly or incidentally affected com-
petition. Id. at 568. The latter were not intended to be covered by the Sherman Act under
the Court's analysis at that time.
In United States v. Addyston Pipe and Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898) aff'd, 175
U.S. 211 (1899), a literal reading of § 1 was further qualified, but reasonableness was still
rejected as a standard. 85 F. 271, 284-93 (6th Cir. 1898). Addyston Pipe and Steel involved
the cartelization of the iron pipe trade. In an opinion affirmed by the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit declared that it would recognize the validity of cer-
tain restraints which were merely ancillary to agreements that were otherwise economically
beneficial. Id. at 282. The court of appeals reasoned that when a restraint was truly ancillary
its competitive benefits were likely to outweigh the losses. Id. at 282-83.
46. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
47. Id.
48. Section 1 focuses on agreements considered restrictive due to their wrongful pur-
poses or effects, while § 2 examines exclusionary actions characterized by the accumulation
or misuse of monopoly power. Both sections ultimately seek the same curtailment of prac-
tices resulting in market control, but § 2 requires a threshold finding of monopoly power.
Even though the two sections approach the monopoly problem differently, it is clear that
the prohibited means by which markets are controlled or competition dampened is a matter
of some indifference. Ultimately, it is irrelevant whether a trade restraint was accomplished
by a contract, some lesser form of agreement, or even by the sheer aggregation of market
power.
49. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
[Vol. 4:57
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one corporation." The court determined that while the consoli-
dated corporation would technically have a much larger share of
the market, the commonly owned individual corporations had long
been functioning jointly and therefore the transfer would have no
real effect on the market. Recognizing that only combinations and
contracts that "unreasonably" restrain trade violated the Act,5" the
Court found the restraint to be reasonable, and allowed the
consolidation.
Although Standard Oil was a step forward from the literal in-
terpretation of Section One, the rule of reason created in that case
was not clearly enunciated.52 In the years immediately following
Standard Oil, the Supreme Court reaffirmed but did not expound
upon this new standard of review.53
In 1918, the Court finally added dimension to the rule of rea-
son. Chicago Board of Trade v. United States64 set forth the basic
guidelines for examining the challenged market restraints. The
Board of Trade passed a rule prohibiting its members from
purchasing or offering to purchase grain between sessions of the
board at a price other than the closing bid. This regulation would
guarantee a common price for all transactions made before the
market opened the next morning.
In analyzing the Board's "call rule," the Court suggested a list
of factors relevant in determining whether a restraint on competi-
tion was unreasonable. The Court's rule of reason analysis required
consideration of the particular business to which the restraint is
applied, the market conditions before and after the restraint was
imposed and the effect of the restraint, whether actual or proba-
ble.5 Additional factors included in the new analysis were the his-
tory of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for
adopting the particular remedy, and the purpose or end sought to
be attained. 6 This is not because good intentions could save an
otherwise objectionable regulation; rather, understanding of intent
was thought to help the court interpret facts and predict conse-
quences.57 After weighing these factors, the Court upheld the
50. Id. at 9.
51. Id. at 63.
52. The "reasonableness" standard employed by the Court lacked specific definition
and was of neccessity subsequently interpreted.
53. E.g., United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 180 (1911).
54. 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
55. Id. at 238.
56. Id.
57. Id.
1987]
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Board's "call rule" as necessary to the conduct of business.
Chicago Board of Trade remains the leading Supreme Court
case outlining the rule of reason.5 8 In analyzing whether a particu-
lar arrangement tends to suppress competition unreasonably,
courts will still apply the Board of Trade factors.5 9 However, lower
courts have had difficulty applying these factors because the Su-
preme Court never assigned them relative weights.6 0 Moreover, the
Court did not determine if any of the factors were dispositive of
the issue of unreasonable restraints." Thus, early critics com-
plained that under a rule of reason analysis, everything was rele-
vant and nothing was dispositive6
Great difficulties resulted from these vague judicial declara-
tions of the rule of reason. The lack of a cogent analytical frame-
work for applying the rule of reason makes the analysis often com-
plicated and prolonged, involving a broad inquiry into both the
business practice of the defendant and the status of the surround-
ing industry.6 3 As a result of this extended factual inquiry by the
court, antitrust cases under the rule of reason are extremely
costly.'4 Furthermore, both judges and juries find it difficult to an-
alyze antitrust issues because they lack the expert understanding
of a market's economy which is needed to determine a practice's
overall effect on competition. 5
58. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution:
Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. Rsv. 6, 14 (1981).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 14-15. "This passage [from Chicago Board of Trade] invites an unlimited,
free-wheeling inquiry ... [tihe trier of fact is left in the dark as to how to decide whether a
challenged practice is substantially anticompetitive." Id.
61. Id.
62. Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 ANTITRUST L. J.
135, 155 (1984).
63. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc., 457 U.S. 332, 343 (1982) (describing the
rule of reason as an "elaborate inquiry").
64. The Supreme Court noted that "[tihe elaborate inquiry into the reasonableness of
a challenged business practice entails significant cost." Id. at 343.
65. Easterbrook, supra note 62, at 154-55. It should also be noted that the period from
1977-1979 initiated a new phase in judicial contribution to antitrust. This phase reinforced
the principle that courts should use strong economic analysis. During this time, the courts
established an abbreviated rule of reason analysis which suggested a departure from the
.traditional rule. Five cases frame this new school of antitrust thought: Continental T.V., Inc.
v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); National Soc. of Prof. Engineers v. United States,
435 U.S. 679 (1978); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S.
1 (1979); Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984) and Monsanto
Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
[Vol. 4:57
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2. THE PER SE DOCTRINE
In an effort to avoid the complicated and prolonged rule of
reason analysis required by Standard Oil and Chicago Board of
Trade, the judiciary created a new standard of review for certain
antitrust cases. Under this new standard, certain agreements are
conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and illegal because of
their pernicious effect on competition and lack of redeeming vir-
tue."' Thus, the new standard became known as the per se doc-
trine. This avoided the necessity for an economic investigation into
the history of the subject industry, that had so often proved
fruitless.17
When judicial experience with a particular kind of restraint
enables a court to predict with certainty that the rule of reason
will condemn that restraint, the court may hold that the restraint
is per se illegal.6 The decision to declare a practice per se illegal
usually rests on two criteria: (1) the anticompetitive harm out-
weighs any possible benefit, and (2) the attempt to identify possi-
ble procompetitive benefits will waste judicial resources and inject
elements of uncertainty to the law. 9 A number of arrangements
are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable restraints of trade,
simply by virtue of their obvious negative effect on competition.70
Once the existence of such an arrangement has been established,
no evidence of actual public injury is required, 71 and no evidence
of the reasonableness of a defendant's conduct will be considered
to justify the actions.72 The rule of per se illegality has been ap-
plied to horizontal and vertical price fixing arrangements,73 divi-
66. Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1958).
67. Id.
68. E.g., United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (grocery store
chain limiting competition among its member franchises was per se violation of the Sher-
man Act).
69. See generally, Note, Tackling Intercollegiate Athletics: An Antitrust Analysis, 87
YALE L. J. 655, at 665 (1978).
70. See, e.g., Northern Pacific, 356 U.S. at 5.
71. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light and Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961).
72. See, e.g., Northern Pacific, 356 U.S. at 5.
73. See United States v. Socony Vacuum, 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (horizontal price-fixing
among oil companies per se illegal); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392
(1927) (horizontal price-fixing among manufacturers and distributors of pottery fixtures per
se illegal); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951) (hori-
zontal price-fixing among liquor producers per se illegal); Arizona v. Maricopa County Medi-
cal Society, 457 U.S. at 334 (doctors could not agree to set maximum prices); Catalano, Inc.,
v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980) (elimination of extension of credit to retailers per
se violative of the Act); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968) (vertical price-fixing
between newspaper publishers and carriers per se illegal).
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sion of markets between competitors,7" tying arrangements,75 and
certain collective refusals to deal, or "group boycotts.""6
The policy behind the per se rule is twofold. First, it is an
attempt to provide stability and predictability in the marketplace.
The per se rule's clear enunciation of the reach and application of
the Act provides ready parameters for market decisions.77 Second,
it promotes judicial efficiency. Application of the per se rule frees a
court from the complicated and prolonged economic investigation
required by the rule of reason.78 The per se rule assumes the ille-
gality of the restraint without regard to the market power of the
defendant. 79
3. ELEMENTS OF A VIOLATION
As courts filtered through the sea of antitrust opinions, liabil-
ity in Section One actions came to rest on three indispensible crite-
ria: (1) an agreement among two or more persons or distinct busi-
ness entities which (2) was intended to harm or unreasonably
restrain competition, and (3) did in fact cause injury to
competition. 0
74. In Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951), the division of
markets among competitors was ruled per se illegal. The Court condemned a cooperative
allocation of territories throughout world-wide markets between the dominant American
producer of tapered roller bearings and British and French firms. The French firms were
also controlled by Timken and its British competitor.
75. The Northern Pacific Court defined a tying arrangement as "an agreement by a
party to sell one product but only on the condition that the buyer also purchases a different
(or tied) product, or at least agrees that he will not purchase that product from any other
supplier." 356 U.S. at 5-6.
76. See Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc. 359 U.S. 207 (1959) (conspiracy by
large stores and distributors not to sell to a retailer, or to sell only at high prices or on
unfavorable terms, constituted a group boycott in violation of the Sherman Act); Fashion
Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) (agreement by members of
the Guild to refuse to sell to retailers who also sold garments copied from a Guild member's
design constituted a group boycott in violation of the Sherman Act). In Eastern States Re-
tail Lumber Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914) horizontal combinations
were found among traders at one level of distribution, which excluded direct competitors
from the market. Thus, a group of retail lumber dealers black-listed lumber wholesalers who
sold directly to the retailer's customers. The obvious purpose of the combination - elimi-
nating competition from the wholesalers - placed it within the prohibited class of undue
and unreasonable restraints.
77. United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609 (1972). Without the per
se rule, businessmen would be left with little aid in predicting in any particular case what
courts would find to be legal or illegal under the Sherman Act.
78. Northern Pacific, 356 U.S. at 5.
79. See Gerhart, The Supreme Court and Antitrust Analysis: The (Near) Triumph of
the Chicago School, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 319, 322.
80. See generally Weistart, League Control of Market Opportunities: A Perspective
on Competition and Cooperation In The Sports Industry, DUKE L.J. 1013 (1984) [hereinaf-
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Assuming that an agreement between two separate entities in
the market has been established, the next step of the analysis of
whether the restraint on competition is unreasonable requires a
two-step determination. In order to identify an unreasonable re-
straint, the court will first ask whether the suspect action is so in-
herently anticompetitive as to be subject to per se condemnation.
If not deemed a per se violation a court will then determine
whether the alleged restraint is unreasonable and violates the rule
of reason by balancing all positive and negative effects on the mar-
ket.81 Under this analysis, the court must balance the anticompeti-
tive effects of the restraint against any claimed procompetitive jus-
tifications. This type of balancing requires an understanding of the
competitive conditions of the relevant market. For a restraint to be
allowed, the affected market must be more competitive as a result
of the questioned restraint, or at least the limitation upon compe-
tition must have legitimate procompetitive components.2 Ulti-
mately, the balancing test depends largely upon how one defines
and comprehends the relevant market.
The bulk of antitrust analysis has historically focused upon
Section One. In recent years, however, Section Two has evolved as
dramatically as its predecessor. "Every person who shall monopo-
lize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any
other person or persons, to monopolize any part of trade or com-
merce among the several states is considered to be in violation of
Section Two.""s Section Two requires the existence of market
domination by a single actor. The fundamental notion underlying
this clause is that the abuse of monopoly power must be checked
through legal mechanisms because the normal market forces will
not be powerful enough to guarantee maximum consumer
welfare.84
Modern cases applying Section Two add the further require-
ment that the suspect conduct must present a real threat of mo-
nopolization in order to be illegal.8 5 Inherent in this threat is some
degree of actual or potential market domination." Market power
ter Cooperation in the Sports Industry].
81. See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918); Gerhart, supra
note 79, at 322.
82. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984); Broadcast
Music Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979); National Soc. of Prof. Engineers v. United States, 435
U.S. 679 (1978); Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. at 4-5.
83. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1890).
84. Cooperation in the Sports Industry, supra note 80, at 1036.
85. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
86. Id.
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has been defined as the ability to raise prices above those that
would be charged in a competitive market. 7 In a broader sense, it
is the capacity to alter the interaction of supply and demand in the
market.8 The determination of market power is "[a]n incredibly
complicated and prolonged economic investigation into the entire
history of the industry involved, as well as related industries." 9
The question ultimately turns on whether the suspect entity is
misusing its market power in an attempt to either monopolize or
extend an existing monopoly. In order to determine if a misuse of
market power has occurred, the essential questions become what
the relevant market is and what its parameters are.9
4. DEFINING THE MARKET
At once the most crucial and misunderstood issue within anti-
trust analysis is the accurate and precise determination of the rele-
vant market. Though market definition is the linchpin in the find-
ing of restraint on competition, courts fail to set forth the
necessary equations to complete a market-definition calculus, leav-
ing the legal community in a practical quandary.
Through the muddied waters, however, some elements have
emerged. To begin at a fundamental level, the alleged violation is
viewed from the perspective of the relevant market because it pro-
vides the basis upon which competitive harms and benefits are bal-
anced. 1 As a result, any antitrust policy divorced from market
considerations will lack an objective benchmark.9
When examined practically, taking into account the logical re-
lationship between an alleged restraint and its market, a restraint
within a large market will rarely be unreasonable, while a restraint
within a small market will always appear unreasonable.9 ' It has
been the inability of the courts to make the proper empirical de-
87. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984); United States
Steel Corp. v. Fortner Ent., 429 U.S. 610 (1977); United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours
& Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
88. E.g., NCAA v. Oklahoma, 465 U.S. 85 (1984).
89. Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1957).
90. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
91. Kaplan v. Burroughs Corp., 611 F.2d 286 (9th Cir. 1979).
92. Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
93. Imagine that Coke and Pepsi entered into a price fixing conspiracy. If the court
determined the relevant market to be cola soft drinks in the United States, a violation
would almost certainly be found because the actions would be an unreasonable restraint on
the market. However, if the market is defined to be all beverages, including soft drinks,
carbonated drinks, coffee, juices, milk, beer, wine, liquor, etc., for the entire world, then it
would be far more difficult to find an unreasonable restraint.
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termination of the relevant market which created the chaos pre-
sent in sports antitrust law. More specifically, it has been the
court's failure to provide the jury undertaking the market defini-
tion as a question of fact a comprehensible guideline by which to
make such a decision. Therefore, the resulting inconsistent market
determinations have produced legal opinions based on internally
inappropriate legal reasoning, which in turn has compounded its
damage when used as precedent for second generation legal analy-
ses. Unfortunately, the bedrock issue of examining competition in
light of the proper relevant market has not been recognized."4
The first threshold in undertaking an antitrust analysis under
either Section One or Section Two is an inquiry into the relevant
market, determining whether the trade or commerce within the
market is affected unreasonably by the alleged restraints. 5 Just
which criteria are to be used in determining the market, however,
is not abundantly clear. In fact, there is precious little common
law, and much less statutory guidance for the court trying to dis-
cover the proper relevant market. Generally, the fuzzy boundaries
of the market can be brought into focus by asking three questions:
(1) what are the market strategies for the good or service under
attack,
(2) what are the effects of the strategy in the marketplace, and
(3) who are the competitors of the good or service in the
marketplace.
The answers to these questions will begin to disclose the pa-
rameters of the relevant market. However, these concepts have
been convoluted by the courts in an attempt to define dispositively
the elusive relevant market. This tortured analysis bifurcated the
issue, giving rise to the relevant product market and the relevant
geographic market, both of which are components of the overall
market definition.
a. The Product Market
A product market definition is based in part upon a descrip-
tion of those groups of similar product producers who have the ac-
tual or potential ability to take significant amounts of business
away from one another.96 The crux of the product market issue is
94. Cooperation in the Sports Industry, supra note 80, at 1027.
95. American Aloe Corp. v. Aloe Creme Laboratories, Inc., 420 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir.
1970); Mercantile Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Quest, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 926 (N.D. Ind. 1969).
96. Eli Lilly & Co. v. SmithKline Corp., 587 F.2d 1056, (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 838 (1979).
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the determination of whether that group of goods or services is so
closely related so that substitutions or interchangeability by the
consumer is possible. The outer boundaries of a product market
can be based upon the reasonable interchangeability of use; in eco-
nomic argot, the cross-elasticity of demand.9 8 Additionally, only
when all relevant sources of supply, including actual rivals and po-
tential market entrants, have been examined may the product
market be fully determined.9
The product market analysis quickly becomes complicated
when the investigation unearths several viable product substitu-
tions which match most, if not all, aspects of the subject product.
Thus, within a larger relevant product market, well defined smaller
and interrelated markets may exist, which in themselves may con-
stitute product markets for antitrust purposes.
An example of such a matrix is professional golf. Within the
larger product market of professional golf, which competes against
other forms of sports and entertainment, exist smaller, interrelated
markets. These interrelated markets compete for: (1) golf tourna-
ments sanctioned by the Professional Golf Association (PGA), (2)
professional golf player's services, i.e., appearances or endorse-
ments, and, (3) the television broadcast of those events.
Each of these interrelated markets could be the relevant prod-
uct market in an antitrust suit, depending on the plaintiff's allega-
tions. The boundaries of each smaller market may be determined
by several factors: the smaller market as a separate economic en-
tity, the peculiar characteristics of the product, distinct customers,
and separate prices.100 Each allegation will ultimately focus on a
particular market which then requires demarcation. Unfortunately,
clear allegations regarding discrete markets are rarely the norm
when there are numerous violations within an interrelated market.
97. See United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
98. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). While a complete anal-
ysis of these important issues is beyond the scope of this article, simply stated, cross-elastic-
ity turns on the price, use and quality of the commodity. Such a problem arose in the
duPont case, where the Court struggled to decide whether cellophane could be part of the
market including aluminum foil, wax paper, "Saran wrap", and polyethylene. This becomes
a crucial factor in the sports industry analysis when considering intraleague economic com-
petition because, the price cross-elasticity of demand among games played in different home
parks is virtually non-existent, making a narrow determination of the market impossible.
See Cooperation in the Sports Industry, supra note 80, at 1030.
99. See generally SmithKline, 587 F.2d 1056.
100. Traditional case law labeled these smaller markets as submarkets. See generally
duPont, 351 U.S. 294, and Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). However,
because the term submarkets has confusing and inaccurate connotations, the more precise
term interrelated market will be used.
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Absent such precise pleadings, the burden devolves on the court to
identify the correct product market. It is the failure of the courts
to draw a bright line of demarcation in identifying interrelated
product markets that has caused antitrust jurisprudence the most
problems. 101
b. The Geographic Market
Though the geographic market may appear simpler than the
product market, upon closer examination it is just as intricate. On
a basic level, if goods are sold across all state lines, courts will hold
the geographic market to be the entire nation. 02 Alternatively, if
the product has limited availability due to restricted geographic
scope, the general rule has been to define the geographic market as
that particular area of availability. 03 A geographic market deter-
mination becomes nebulous, however, when no clear distribution
pattern emerges. Courts then begin to inquire into price relation-
ships, hoping to find geographic and economic parameters for the
market based on the cost a consumer is willing to pay, and where
the consumer is willing to pay it. In other words, the geographic
market is that area where there is competition for customers.
Thus, a correlation between price and its movement will begin
to draw the boundaries of the geographic market. Such an analysis
101. This problem is highlighted when one takes into account the various professional
sports leagues in the United States. When considering the National Football League (NFL)
from a product market perspective, the question becomes whether there are 28 product mar-
kets in the 28 cities with franchises, i.e., the product as Miami Dolphins Football in the
Greater Miami market and as Buffalo Bills Football in the Greater Buffalo market, or
whether there is simply one product, NFL Football, competing nationwide. See generally
Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 990 (1984).
102. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
103. An example of the confusion that can arise when examining the geographic mar-
ket is seen when two franchises exist in the same city. The resolution of the issue will turn
on whether the market for the sport is defined to be nationwide with competition against all
other entertainment, or local competition against each other (e.g., the NFL and the Los
Angeles Rams & Raiders). Under a geographic market determination, the main question
becomes one of competition for customers. Such competition will typically be reflected in a
war over ticket prices. In reality, ticket prices remain on par because the price cross-elastic-
ity of demand among games played in different home parks is virtually zero. In fact, ticket
prices and availability are not determined by competition with other clubs, but by competi-
tion with other uses of the consumers leisure time, such as TV, movies, or the beach. Fur-
thermore, club revenues are more a product of its own and the visiting team's league stand-
ing as opposed to any independent competitive commercial strategy it may adopt against
the other team in its city, or other teams in the league. All these factors point to the reality
that professional sports compete on a national level, though recent courts have failed to
admit this. See generally J. MARKHAM & P. TEPLITZ, BASEBALL ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POL-
icy, 89-93 (1981); and L.A. Coliseum, 726 F.2d 1381.
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is fraught with inexactness, however, and often results in legal
nightmares. Courts have seemingly settled on the simplistic notion
that the geographic market is that section of the country where the
firm can increase its price without losing many customers to alter-
native suppliers outside that area."0' Unfortunately, the case law
does not provide a clear basis for such an analysis. Despite the crit-
ical nature of the market determination, the courts continued to
miss the issue of defining the market. Thus, future analysis must
be cognizant of the existing state of confusion in market definition.
5. MARKET POWER THRESHOLD TEST
Aware of the importance of market determination for Sher-
man Act analyses, courts developed the Market Power Threshold
Test (MPTT). Based upon the more structured rule of reason
analysis, the MPTT stipulates that when the alleged restraining
defendant does not clearly possess substantial market power, the
court must dismiss the Section One claim without further exami-
nation.105 Though the Supreme Court has not embraced the
MPTT, several circuits have adopted the analysis. 0 6
Market power is the economic thread woven into the fabric of
market definition. A party possessing market power has the ability
to alter supply and demand within the market, e.g., the power to
raise the price of a commodity above competitive levels without
losing sales. Alternatively, if the alleged defendant were to raise
prices but lose sales, there would be no power to affect -adversely
the market, and thus there could not be a Section One violation.1 7
Regardless of the MPTT results, the crucial determination again
rests on the ever-elusive market definition.
104. See Landes & Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937
(1981). A detailed look at the many components to the antitrust market determination is
beyond the scope of this work. Specific to the geographic market, for example, many ques-
tions arise as to whether it should be looked at from the supply or demand perspective. See,
e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
105. E.g., NCAA v. Oklahoma, 465 U.S. 84 (1984).
106. See George R. Whitten Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 508 F.2d 547 (1st
Cir. 1974); Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126 (2d Cir. 1978); Muenster Butane,
Inc. v. Stewart Co., 651 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1981). See also, Note, Did the Supreme Court
Fumble? The Supreme Court's Failure to Endorse a Market Power Threshold Test to the
Application of the Rule of Reason for Cases Under Section One of the Sherman Act in
NCAA v. Board of Regents, 27 B.C.L. REV. 579 (1986) [hereinafter Supreme Court Fumble].
107. See Supreme Court Fumble, supra note 106, at 592.
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6. SINGLE ENTITY
Having generally examined Sherman Act violations, it is now
necessary to examine the entity accused of such violations. Section
One requires that an alleged restraint must be the product of an
agreement between two or more separate entities. Correspondingly,
antitrust law mandates that a "single entity" cannot conspire with
itself to restrain trade, and therefore such a single entity is im-
mune from Section One proscription. The threshold determination
is whether such a single entity exists.
In many respects, the definition of a single entity is as con-
fused as the market definition. The basic premise of the single en-
tity defense centers on the theory that the entity's individual com-
ponents are so interrelated that they can justifiably be expressed
as united elements of a co-venture pursuing a common end.""
Courts have outlined several criteria for defining a single en-
tity. 9 The most important is the "Unity of Economic Interest."'" 0
This test determines whether the several units are in reality work-
ing together as a whole, promoting a single economic interest. Such
a notion can only be defined in view of the market in which it acts
with common economic interests; therefore, the single entity analy-
sis also arrives at a crucial and difficult determination of the
market.
This market determination is particularly difficult when exam-
ining a professional sports league. If it is held that the sports
league as a whole competes in the entertainment market, e.g., NFL
football competing nationwide with baseball, movies and the
beach, then the league must be a single entity. Alternatively, if the
product is the franchise's events in the local city, e.g., L.A. Rams
football against other forms of football in Los Angeles, then the
league is a collection of entities, not a single entity. Regardless,
this factual determination requires a full-blown market analysis.
The courts have refused to embrace this reality and have instead,
108. See Cooperation in the Sports Industry, supra note 80, at 1038.
109. A strict constructionist approach would require that a single entity fall within the
fixed parameters of a formal partnership, with control retained over all basic decisions of
strategy and managerial policy, joint ownership of assets and sharing of profits or losses. A
more enlightened perspective, aware of the changing and intricate economic forms necessary
for our society to advance its dynamic marketplace, would realize that such a rigid vision is
blind to the purpose of the Single Entity provision. See Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 548
F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 910 (1977); Perma Life Muffler Inc., v. Inter-
national Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
110. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
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quite inappropriately, relied on a more formalistic approach."1
B. Antitrust Application to Sports Leagues
The legal history of professional sports has been relatively
short; the antitrust history, even shorter. Only since the late 1950's
have the courts applied the Act to sports. Prior to that, the sports
industry was generally considered beyond the reach of the Act.
This was due to the dubious 1922 Supreme Court opinion in Fed-
eral Baseball Club v. National League of Professional Baseball
Clubs, 2 holding baseball exempt from antitrust liability.
Courts continued to misapply the Act in other sports, creating
a pernicious and illusory veil in many judicial analyses. Having
struggled from the onset with sports, courts improperly granted ex-
emptions for several decades. " '
In 1958, however, the Supreme Court finally held that there
was nothing inherent in a sports organization meriting an exemp-
tion from liability under the Act." 4 From that legal springboard,
the courts, though perplexed and confused by the market compo-
nents of the emerging industry, began attacking sports associations
and leagues. Unfortunately, the courts' new-found application of
antitrust laws to leagues implemented suspect legal reasoning.
1. CURRENT LEGAL STATUS
In the past thirty years, the allegations against leagues fell
into two basic categories. Primary, and critical to the leagues very
existence, are attacks upon intra-league rules." 5 Secondary are at-
tacks on sports associations for conspiring with other entities in
the market." 6 In both instances the challenges have been brought
by outside entities or league members.
Leagues and suspect intra-league rules have always fallen into
a rule of reason analysis." 7 The reason for this is unclear." 8 How-
ever, some courts have found that a sports league is a collection of
111. See generally Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381
(9th Cir.), cert denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984).
112. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
113. See generally Kempf, The Misapplication of Antitrust Laws to Professional
Sports Leagues, 32 DE PAUL L. REV. 625 (1982).
114. International Boxing Club v. United States, 358 U.S. 242 (1959).
115. Kapp v. NFL, 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974); L.A. Coliseum, 726 F.2d 1381.
116. United States Football League v. NFL, 634 F. Supp. 1155 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); NCAA
v. Oklahoma, 465 U.S. 85 (1984).
117. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 266 (1972).
118. L.A. Coliseum, 726 F.2d 1381.
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separate entities and not a single entity."1 " This determination, in
turn, logically requires that the intra-league rules may be attacked
under Section One.
Under Section One, such rules may be analyzed as per se ille-
gal, or put through the rule of reason balancing test. Courts have
almost exclusively held that intra-league rules are not per se viola-
tions, stating that due to the unique nature of the sports industry
they must be viewed in light of all relevant factors. With the un-
predictable rule of reason analysis, courts have ruled with tremen-
dous inconsistency, sometimes holding the sports league in viola-
tion,' 2" sometimes holding no violation1" and sometimes granting
exemption to certain sports.'22
With the courts clearly capable of finding similar league rules
to fall anywhere on the antitrust continuum, the sports industry is
left in a state of total unpredictability. It is apparent that the
courts have failed to undertake the proper market analysis in com-
puting their calculus for an antitrust violation. 23 This critical
omission has precipitated many improper antitrust holdings.12
Without looking at and accurately determining the market, it is
impossible to decide whether there is a conspiracy, whether that
conspiracy restrains free trade, or whether there is an extension of
a monopoly. Consequently, much of the controlling precedent gov-
erning sports law is fundamentally suspect.
The courts use several reasons to justify holding leagues as
pluralities. One source of support has been the "intraenterprise
conspiracy" doctrine. 2  This theory stipulates that a Section One
119. Id.
120. Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
121. See Deesen v. Professional Golfer's Ass'n of Am., 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1966);
and Gunter Harz Sports, Inc. v. United States Tennis Ass'n, 511 F. Supp. 1103 (D. Neb.
1981).
122. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 266 (1972).
123. An example of this failure occurred in L. A. Coliseum where although the court
stated that "to a large extent the market is determined by how one defines the entity" in
fact, the exact opposite is true. Basic antitrust principles mandate that in order to deter-
mine the entity, one must first define the market. Understandably, such misapplication can
only cause confusion and erroneous holdings.
124. E.g., L.A. Coliseum, 726 F.2d 1381; Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
125. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 141-42
(1968); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71, 82-83
(9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970). On the doctrine generally, see L. SULLI-
VAN, ANTITRUST, § 114 (1977); Areeda, Intraenterprise Conspiracy in Decline, 97 HARV. L.
Rav. 451 (1983); Handler & Smart, The Present Status of the Intracorporate Conspiracy
Doctrine, 3 CARDOZO L. REV. 23, 73 (1981); McQuade, Conspiracy, Multicorporate Enter-
prises, and Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 41 VA. L. REV. 183 (1955); Note, "Conspiring
Entities" Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 95 HARV. L. REv. 661 (1982).
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conspiracy will be found even when the two entities are commonly
owned corporations, if they are separate legal entities. Another ar-
gument for plurality has been simple precedent. Here, courts have
argued that since negotiations between a league and players have
violated Section One, it can then be inferred that the league is sub-
ject to Section One for all its actions.1"6
Regardless of the claimed reasoning, it is insufficient to over-
come the reality that courts to date have failed to properly con-
sider the market in analyzing a league's single entity defense. The
market investigation is instrumental to a single entity decision.
Only when seen in light of a proper market definition can one de-
cide whether or not a league is a single entity within that mar-
ket.1"7 If courts fail to properly recognize the league as a single en-
tity, then any per se or rule of reason analysis must also be
improper.
The recent Ninth Circuit opinion in Los Angeles Memorial
Coliseum Commission v. NFL" 8 involved the legality of an intra-
league rule prohibiting the shifting of a league franchise without a
three-fourths vote of approval by the league members. The court
continued to deny the applicability of the single entity defense. 12 9
The L.A. Coliseum court analyzed the franchise shifting rule
under a rule of reason framework, holding that the league rule was
illegal under Section One. In both the single entity determination
and the rule of reason balancing test, the court failed to examine
all the elements of a proper market determination. Holding the in-
tra-league rule as illegal on this basis raises questions as to the
jurisprudential foundation of sports antitrust decisions. Neverthe-
less, L.A. Coliseum stands as the newest brick in the wall of confu-
sion which surrounds sports antitrust law.
126. See L.A. Coliseum, 726 F.2d 1381, 1388; North Am. Soccer League v. NFL, 670
F.2d 1257 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982). Under earlier reasoning, courts held
that leagues were analyzed under the rule of reason because the court lacked experience
with the sports industries. Later courts, realizing that this was a false premise under which
sports leagues were attacked, attempted to cover the improper tracks of the earlier decisions
by saying that the attached rule of reason analysis was not because of a lack of experience,
but rather because leagues are horizontal restraints. See NCAA v. Oklahoma, 465 U.S. 85
(1984). This reasoning is faulty because if leagues were in fact horizontal restraints (which
they are not) then they would be a per se violation, and not analyzed under the rule of
reason.
127. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
128. 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984).
129. Id. at 1388.
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2. FORGOTTEN ANTITRUST LOGIC
Virtually lost within the plethora of sports antitrust cases lie
two properly decided opinions: San Francisco Seals, Ltd. v.
NHL"s0 and Levin v. National Basketball Association.'3' Though
both opinions are relatively short, they offer guideposts from which
to direct the proper application of antitrust principles to leagues.
In addressing whether a single entity existed, and alternatively
if a Section One violation occurred, the Seals court was aware of
the threshold requirement of a proper market determination. The
court accurately considered the express criterion of reasonable in-
terchangeability of use, and the implied criterion of identifying the
competitors in the marketplace." 2
Having decided that the relevant product market was profes-
sional hockey, with the relevant geographic market as North
America, the Seals court held that two entities must exist for there
to be a Section One violation. Based upon a defined relevant mar-
ket,1"3 the court found that the league was a "single unit competing
as such with other similar professional leagues,' ' 13 ' and conse-
quently removed it from Section One exposure. The Levin court
further supported this notion by holding that league members are
"just venturers dependent upon one another as partners.' 13 5
In a dissent to a denial of certiorari in National Football
League v. North American Soccer League,13 Justice Rehnquist
elucidated the failure of the courts in sports antitrust cases to ex-
amine properly the market. As a consequence, the courts produced
erroneous precedent. Rehnquist found that individual sports
leagues produce a product, e.g., professional football, that com-
petes with other forms of entertainment in the entertainment mar-
ket. Implicit therein is the conclusion that the league is a single
entity and is thus removed from Section One scrutiny.
Further support for the improper application of antitrust law
to the sports industry can be found in the powerful dissent of
Judge Williams in L.A. Coliseum.37 Reinforcing the notion that in
order to have a Section One violation the entities must compete
130. 379 F. Supp. 966 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
131. 385 F. Supp. 149 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
132. San Francisco Seals, 379 F. Supp. at 967.
133. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
134. San Francisco Seals, 379 F. Supp. at 970.
135. Levin v. NBA, 385 F. Supp. at 150.
136. 459 U.S. 1074, 1075 (1982).
137. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1404-05 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984).
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economically, despite the reality that individual franchises within a
league never compete economically, Judge Williams held that
leagues must therefore be single entities. 1 8 Moreover, opines Wil-
liams, to hold that a league is not a single entity, but an aggrega-
tion of economic competitors is tantamount to ruling that the
league is itself per se illegal. 139 This notion is based on the numer-
ous regulations attendant to the league's fundamental structure.
These include the draft, scheduling of meetings between teams,
and the system of pooled and shared revenues among franchise
owners. If viewed as agreements among a collection of entities
rather than a single entity, these regulations must violate Section
One.14 0 Furthermore, Judge Williams points out the lack of stand-
ing of a league member to attack an intra-league rule to which the
league member is contractually bound.
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL
Having criticized the manner in which courts analyze sports, it
is necessary to offer an alternative legal framework. This structure
will hopefully penetrate the fog generated by erroneous precedent
and in turn hold sports leagues and associations up to a progres-
sive, rather than reactionary, light.
Creating a touchstone from which sports organizations can be
measured for antitrust purposes, the structure, a Cooperative
Sports Authority (CSA), must first be clearly defined. Simply
stated, a CSA shall consist of the following elements: (1) a formal
agreement outlining procedures and obligations, voluntarily ad-
hered to, (2) a structure coordinating the scheduling of public exhi-
bitions of the sport, (3) a common identity in the marketplace, and
(4) an economic interdependence in establishing and promoting its
particular product in the marketplace.
The threshold elements, when met, would establish a CSA as a
single entity for Section One exemption purposes. Such a determi-
nation by the courts would properly situate a league within the
antitrust framework, setting up an accurate and precise legal anal-
ysis. The four elements to be considered in determining the exis-
tence of a CSA must be examined in light of the market in which
the particular sport competes. It is only upon a legitimate interpre-
tation of the market that a proper CSA analysis can be conducted.
Upon analysis of the first element, requiring a voluntary for-
138. Id. at 1405.
139. Id. at 1408.
140. Id.
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mal agreement among the members, it is evident that most leagues
operate under such a contract. This is usually in the form of an
owners agreement. This type of agreement is indispensable if the
sport or league is going to prosper in the marketplace. Without it,
the sport could never develop the framework to produce the events
necessary for its existence.
The second element, focusing on necessary scheduling and
rulemaking, has historically been one of the bedrock responsibili-
ties of a league. Quite obviously, without such formality, most
sports would not exist in the marketplace. Courts have recognized
that such action is acceptable within a single entity framework.'4
Crucial to a single entity determination is the third require-
ment that the CSA have a common identity in the marketplace.
This will often surface in terms of the league competing within the
market of its particular sport, for example, the NHL within the
larger market of professional hockey. When the league establishes
its identity in the marketplace the support for single entity deter-
mination is great. This determination becomes more likely as the
relavant market expands."'
Intertwined with the common identity in the market is the
fourth element requiring economic interdependence in the promo-
tion of the common identity. This element is manifested in several
ways, including the sharing of television revenues on both a na-
tional and local level, gate receipts, and balancing the flow of tal-
ent into the CSA, usually through a draft. The foundation to this
element comes from the premise that franchises or units within a
CSA do not economically compete among themselves, but rather
compete with other products in the market. These other products
include events in that sport, other sports, and other forms of
entertainment." 3
Assuming that the CSA has met the preceding four criteria
and is thus viewed as a single entity, then several antitrust equa-
tions are triggered. First, in regard to intra-authority decisions, the
CSA would be properly held immune from Section One attack. It
should not be forgotten, however, that even if a CSA's intra-league
rules are exempt from Section One, the CSA's possible conspiracies
with other entities in the market, e.g. television networks, are still
141. San Francisco Seals, Ltd. v. NHL, 379 F. Supp. 966 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
142. Id.
143. See generally Judge Williams' dissenting opinion in L.A. Coliseum, 726 F.2d
1381, 1401, and Justice Rehnquist's dissent in NFL v. North Am. Soccer League, 459 U.S.
1074 (1982).
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open to attack. 144 The CSA's intra-authority rules may still be at-
tacked under Section Two.14 5
Additional checks on the actions of a CSA under a single en-
tity determination include the forces working within the collective
bargaining framework. Under collective bargaining, management
and labor often agree to terms based upon their relatively balanced
powers. Without such balance, their agreements would appear lop-
sided and suspect under the antitrust laws. 14
With an alternative framework in place, many conflicts spe-
cific to professional tennis may be examined. This must be done
with both the existing case law and the CSA model in mind. We
will first look at the men's professional tennis "league", 4 7 and then
the infrastructure of men's professional tennis as a sport to deter-
mine the legality of all the relevant actions and markets in tennis.
V. ANTITRUST ANALYSIS OF THE COUNCIL
In the current litigation surrounding professional tennis,
ProServ and IMG assert that the Council violated Sections One
and Two in promulgating a "conflict of interest" rule. 48 The thrust
of these allegations focuses upon the manner in which the court
should view the Council within the context of sports antitrust. As
outlined, the case law is confused and often illogical, leading to
inconsistent judicial determinations. Regardless of which direction
a court might turn, be it single entity or multi-entity, per se or rule
of reason, Section One or Two illegality, the first question to be
examined in deciding these issues is the relevant market. Only af-
ter the market is identified may the court properly implement an
antitrust analysis.
Amidst the confusion of L.A. Coliseum and the controlling
case law, the Volvo court will be troubled from the start. The L.A.
Coliseum court established a very small restrictive market for pro-
fessional football in an action challenging intra-league rules. The
Court held that the market was only L.A. Raider football in Los
144. See generally United States Football League v. NFL, 634 F. Supp. 1155
(S.D.N.Y. 1986).
145. See generally Judge Williems' dissenting opinion in L.A. Coliseum, 726 F.2d
1381, 1401.
146. Collective bargaining agreements provide the impetus for advancements includ-
ing increased salaries and benefits for players in many sports leagues. See also Kennedy &
Williamson, Money: The Monster Threatening Sports, (pts. 1-3), SP. ILLUSTRATED, July 17,
1978, at 29, SP. ILLUSTRATED, July 24, 1978, at 34 and SP. ILLUSTRATED, July 31, 1978, at 34.
147. The Men's International Professional Tennis Council (the MIPTC).
148. See infra note 199 and accompanying text.
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Angeles. 49 The court in the Southern District of New York is com-
pelled, to some degree, to find a correspondingly restrictive rele-
vant market for tennis. If such a determination is made, the next
step is to find the Council a multi-party entity. By defining the
market as the local tournament, the product becomes local tennis,
the Council becomes a collection of local entities, and is therefore
subject to Section One attack. 150
Following L.A. Coliseum, the Southern District court will de-
termine whether the Council's rules are per se violations or
whether the rules should be analyzed under the rule of reason. Per-
petuating the misplaced logic that courts are not familiar with the
sports industry, the court would presumably bump the Council's
rules out of a per se and into a rule of reason analysis. Under this
elaborate balancing test, the court will then weigh all the anti-com-
petitive and pro-competitive effects of the rules within the market.
Once into such an analysis, the direction the court might turn
is unpredictable. The judge has great latitude, for there are no
strict guidelines once into the rule of reason analysis. This com-
plete lack of predictability may be the most harmful aspect of the
ruling because it leaves the sports industry without guidance for
the future.
The Council will most likely satisfy all the elements of a CSA
analysis. Specifically, the Council operates with a formal agree-
ment exemplified by its constitution and by-laws. 5 ' The Council is
the scheduling and rulemaking body with respect to all sanctioned
tennis. 152 The Council has an overall sponsor, Nabisco, which gives
its Grand Prix circuit a common identity in the market.1 53 The
Council also shares revenue with the players, thus demonstrating
the necessary common economic interest. 54 Collectively, these
facts qualify the Council for CSA status. 5
Assuming the Council is found to be a CSA, and thus a single
entity in the market, then under the model outlined, it would be
exempt from Section One for all intra-authority rules. Although
immune from Section One, the rule would still be susceptible to
attack under Section Two.
149. See generally L.A. Coliseum, 726 F.2d 1381.
150. Id.
151. MIPTC Yearbook, supra note 6.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See Cryan, Johnson & Metanias, Tennis Giants Volley For Control Under Anti-
trust Attack, N.Y. L.J. March 27, 1987, at 5.
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A Section Two analysis requires that there be no attempt to
monopolize or extend an existing monopoly. Thus, inquiry into the
Council's actions must question whether the Council's conduct is
exclusionary, and if it is, whether that justifies an inference of ille-
gal purpose and intent."'
In order to properly analyze this issue, the first question is
what is the relevant market. In determining the product market,
the investigation must center on an effort to locate all substitutes
available to buyers of the seller's product. It is important to deter-
mine the competitors of the Council in the relevant product mar-
ket, and the market strategies that the Council implements in pro-
moting its product in the market.
Under such an analysis, the product market may be defined
broadly so as to encompass the entertainment industries,157 or nar-
rowly, to consist only of sanctioned men's professional tennis.158 If
the product market is defined to be the entertainment industries,
then the sheer size of the product market would indicate that the
Council lacks any market power, and therefore would not violate
Section Two. If the market is narrowly construed, then the Council
would possess the market size necessary to be open to Section Two
attack, and the question becomes whether the Council is attempt-
ing to monopolize the market.
The Council is in the business of producing a "tennis" prod-
uct, or more specifically one form of a tennis product, Council-
sanctioned tennis. The next threshold question becomes what
products may be reasonably interchangeable with Council tennis.
Is the answer football, baseball, movies and the beach, or is the
answer simply other professional tennis events? Ultimately, the
product market should be defined as men's professional tennis, in
which the Council can be characterized as one entity within the
product market.
With reference to the geographic component of the relevant
market, the nature and participation of professional tennis is inter-
national because tournaments are played on every continent and
televised to a global audience. Thus, the geographic component to
the equation would be world-wide.
Viewing the Council in the context of a world-wide market for
professional tennis, its marktt power is dominant only in terms of
156. Cf. United States v. Grinell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570 (1966).
157. See Justice Rehnquist's dissent in NFL v. North Am. Soccer League, 459 U.S.
1074 (1982).
158. See San Francisco Seals, Ltd. v. NHL, 379 F. Supp. 966 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
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Council-sanctioned tennis. Although the Council has absolute con-
trol over sanctioned events, it does not have a monopoly on world-
wide professional tennis. The conflict of interest regulation is initi-
ated only to promote and protect Council-style professional tennis.
Consequently, analysis of the regulation under the CSA model and
Section Two would establish the promulgation of intra-league rules
as sound business practice and therefore non-monopolistic.
Beyond attacking the conflict of interest rule, ProServ has
raised several other antitrust allegations, all stemming from Coun-
cil requirements upon players. These allegations center on the
Council's "Commitment Agreements" with players. The top play-
ers who want to compete in the Grand Prix events must sign a
"Commitment Agreement" with the Council.'59 The basic terms of
the contract require the athlete to play in certain events "pro-
duced" by the Council, as well as in an additional fourteen events
"sanctioned" by the Council.160 Moreover, the contracts insulate
those events from other tennis competition by limiting the players'
freedom to participate in other tennis events. As a by-product of
participating in Council events, players earn "bonus points" which
may translate into dollars at the end of the year.
ProServ and 1MG argue that if they decide to produce a non-
sanctioned event they are severely limited by the terms of the
Commitment Agreements. 6' ProServ and IMG contend that the
Commitment Agreements provide sanctioned events a total mo-
nopoly for approximately one-third of the year. This is evidenced
by the fact that the Commitment Agreements prohibit the top 100
men's singles players from playing in any non-sanctioned and non-
recognized event during sixteen weeks of the year.'6 2 Additionally,
ProServ and IMG assert that it is not feasible for them to produce
a non-sanctioned event during the four weeks that the Council and
the ITF have reserved for Davis Cup events.6 3 Therefore, a total
of 20 weeks exist during which the Council and affiliated events
permit no competition with their tournaments.' "
ProServ and IMG further state that the Council, in addition
159. MIPTC Yearbook, supra note 6, at 150.
160. Id.
161. Memorandum in Opposition to the Council's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint,
at 13, Volvo N. Am. Corp. v. Men's Int'l Prof. Tennis Council, No. 85 Civ. 2959 (KTD)
(S.D.N.Y. 1985).
162. MIPTC Yearbook, supra note 6, at 60.
163. Id.
164. Memorandum in Opposition to the Council's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint,
Volvo N. Am. Corp. v. Men's Int'l Prof. Tennis Council, No. 85 Civ. 2959 (KTD) (S.D.N.Y.
1985).
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to monopolizing twenty weeks of the year through the Commit-
ment Agreements, requires all the top players to spend another
twenty weeks playing in events produced by the Council and its
affiliated members. 165 Consequently, ProServ and IMG claim that
the Council has succeeded in monopolizing the essential input of
player's services to such an extent that they have eliminated the
possibility of any stable competition developing. 6 '
The Council argues that a player who chooses to sign a Com-
mitment Agreement obtains certain benefits and in turn is obli-
gated to enter a certain number of Grand Prix tournaments. Addi-
tionally, the player is to obey certain restrictions in regard to the
"special events" they can enter. 6 7 The Council further maintains
that the Commitment Agreements are not exclusive contracts and
do not require a player to play only in Council-sanctioned events,
nor is the player obligated to sign a Commitment Agreement to
participate in Grand Prix events. 68
Moreover, the Council insists that the Commitment Agree-
ments successfully induce players to sell their services to producers
of sanctioned events and thus, ProServ and IMG, as producers of
special events are forced to compete by offering players competi-
tive incentives to appear in their events. ProServ and IMG assert
this action by the Council constitutes a barrier to entry into the
market of event production. The Council protests that the alleged
injury, if any, is not an antitrust injury, but is a consequence of
competition.' 69
Through the Grand Prix Bonus Pool the Council forces sanc-
tioned events and the Grand Prix sponsor to contribute money to a
fund that is distributed based not on the players' performance in
individual events, but rather on the number of points the players
accumulate for their performance each year. ProServ and IMG
contend this arrangement conditions payment for the bonus points
earned in an event on the players participation in additional
events. This system requires players to participate in as many of
the events controlled by the Council as possible and correspond-
ingly inhibits their participation in competing events.
The Council maintains that the bonus pools are by analogy
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, at 36.
Volvo N. Am. Corp. v. Men's Int'l Prof. Tennis Council, No. 85 Civ. 2959 (KTD) (S.D.N.Y.
1985).
168. Id.
169. Id.
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nothing more than price competition. As a result, the sponsors of
"special events" are forced to offer economic incentives to induce
professionals to play non-Council-sanctioned events. If the Council
is found to be a multi-entity organization subject to Section One,
the Commitment Agreements and Bonus Pool monies would be an-
alyzed under the rule of reason. Unfortunately, there are no guide-
lines to predict the judicial outcome with any certainty.
Analyzed under a CSA framework, however, it appears these
agreements would be considered intra-league rules, since the play-
ers are a one-third component of the Council. Thus, the rules
would be exempt from Section One when promulgated by a CSA.
The analysis would then shift to Section Two.
This inquiry must center on whether the Council is attempting
to create a monopoly in the world-wide men's professional tennis
market with the promulgation of the Commitment Agreements and
the Bonus Pool. A potential violation of Section Two becomes evi-
dent when the Council attempts to restrict players to only sanc-
tioned events. The Council is allowed to control where and to what
extent its style of tennis is exhibited, but when it tries to control
the entire market by excluding competitors through various rules
and regulations, a Section Two violation may exist.
The Bonus Pool standing alone should not be violative of anti-
trust laws because it is not an attempt to control the market but
only an economic incentive to players. Thus the finding of Section
Two illegality for the Commitment Agreements would open a com-
pletely free market in tennis to the players since they would no
longer be restricted to only Council-sanctioned events.
VI. ANTITRUST ANALYSIS OF PROSERV AND IMG
A. The Council's Standing to Sue
ProServ and IMG challenge the Council's ability to maintain
its counterclaim. They assert that such an action must be brought
derivatively on behalf of the Council membership: the players,
owners, and the ITF. ProServ and IMG point out that membership
in the Council constituencies is not tantamount to support of the
Council's actions and therefore, the Council does not necessarily
have the mandate of its membership to bring the counterclaim.'7 0
Furthermore, ProServ and IMG assert that the claims brought by
the Council fail to allege any significant damages to its members,
170. MIPTC Yearbook, supra note 6, at 8.
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and thus the Council has no standing to counterclaim against
them.171
ProServ and IMG also argue that the membership of the
Council is rife with conflict over the very issues raised in this suit.
Recalling that one-third of the Council is comprised of tournament
owners (including ProServ and IMG), ProServ and IMG allege it
would be preposterous for the Council to have standing to curtail
the business activities of part of its own membership. In fact,
ProServ and IMG conclude that since the Council purports to re-
present both the players (sellers) and tournaments (buyers), the
inherent conflict prevents the Council from fairly representing
those groups in this action.
What ProServ and IMG overlook is that the Council repre-
sents tennis, which by its very nature is comprised of competing
interests. It is alleged by the Council that ProServ and IMG have
intentionally employed anti-competitive tactics to the detriment of
the Council, and therefore tennis, evidencing true injury. As a fair
and impartial representative of the sport, it seems that the Coun-
cil's "interest" and "antitrust injury" thresholds for standing have
been satisfied. 172
In Warth v. Seldin,171 the Supreme Court recognized that an
association has standing to sue on its own behalf for injuries it has
sustained, and not merely as a representative of its members.
Moreover, the standing of professional sports associations, in an
antitrust context, to sue in their own right has been repeatedly and
uniformly confirmed in such cases such as North American Soccer
League v. National Football League.174 There, for example, two
professional sports leagues asserted antitrust claims and counter-
claims stemming from the NFL's ban on simultaneous ownership
of football and soccer teams.175 Both the district court and the Sec-
ond Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the merits of the claims,
implicitly recognizing that the leagues were the proper parties to
171. Motion to Dismiss at 7, Volvo N. Am. Corp. v. Men's Int'l Prof. Tennis Council,
No. 85-2959 (KTD) (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
172. An antitrust plaintiff must allege that he has suffered an injury of the type the
antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes defendant's
acts unlawful. Associated Gen'l Contractors of California, Inc. v. California St. Council of
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 538-40 (1983); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429
U.S. 477, 489 (1977); Crimpers Promotions, Inc. v. Home Box Office, Inc., 724 F.2d 290, 293
(2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1252 (1984).
173. 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975).
174. 505 F. Supp. 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), modified, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982).
175. 505 F. Supp. 659, 662, 670 F.2d 1249, 1250.
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conduct the suit.176 Each court also adopted the characterization of
the leagues as competing with each other in the entertainment in-
dustry and that damage to any professional sports league member
has some effect on the stability, success and operations of both the
league and its individual members.17
Some form of an economic joint venture is essential for a pro-
fessional sports association to attract fans, sponsors and athletes to
the sport. 78 The organization of a professional sports association
for promotion and supervision of the game necessarily entails the
ability to advance claims, as the Council has done, to protect the
competitive processes within the relevant markets.
The Council, as the body responsible for the structure, sched-
uling and administration of the Grand Prix Circuit, has enumer-
ated both economic and non-economic interests in its regulations.
ProServ and IMG have challenged the very rules the Council has
enacted to carry out its directive. Since the Council is the only en-
tity in a position to advance and enforce such rules, it is essential
to the sport that its position be fully considered.
B. Claims Against ProServ and IMG
This antitrust litigation addresses many issues of first impres-
sion, including an attack on ancillary sports service simultaneously
acting as mainline sports operators. 79 This shift away from the old
view of sports antitrust which examined sports leagues or associa-
tions to a new perspective emphasizing the discrete business enti-
ties involved appears to be a novel judicial undertaking. This al-
lows the court to apply the Sherman Act to sports businesses not
involved within the league structure.
For purposes of this work, it will be assumed that the factual
allegations against ProServ and IMG are true. Regardless of which
antitrust allegation against ProServ and IMG is initially analyzed,
one must begin with a proper market determination. The market
determination is critical with regard to the claims against ProServ
and IMG because it is "control" within the market of a tennis
event which may ultimately determine the issues. In order to de-
cide upon the relevant market, the court will examine who are
competitors and what are their market strategies. Furthermore, the
176. 505 F. Supp. 659, 662, 670 F.2d 1249, 1250.
177. 505 F. Supp. 659, 664 670 F.2d 1249, 1252-53.
178. 670 F.2d 1249, 1252.
179. In this context, a mainline sports operator would be analogous to a franchise
owner in the NFL or a tournament owner with the Council.
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court will look to see which products may reasonably be in-
terchanged, all in an effort to make the proper market
determination.
With reference to ProServ, their corporate activities under at-
tack include representing players, owning and managing tourna-
ments, and producing the television broadcast of tennis tourna-
ments. These activities center around a tennis event or
tournament, which is the relevant product market at issue. Deter-
mining which market a tennis event functions within will first be-
come clear when it is analyzed in light of who its competitors are.
In this instance the question becomes who competes with Council-
sanctioned tennis events owned by ProServ. One possible response
to this issue is other professional tennis events.
Due to the inherent international aspects of tennis, it appears
the geographic market is the world. Taking all these components
into account, the relevant market for ProServ and IMG appears to
be professional tennis world-wide. This determination is to some
degree complicated bythe smaller interrelated markets of: (1) pro-
fessional tennis services, (2) professional tennis tournaments, (3)
television broadcasts of these tournaments which operate within
the relevant market.
Examination of the relevant market will also require question-
ing whether products exist which are sufficiently close substitutes.
In regard to tennis tournaments, the product required for the tour-
nament to function is tennis players. Correspondingly, only tennis
players can be substituted and still allow a tennis tournament to
function. As a result, the demarcation around the relevant market
appears to end with professional tennis since other types of ath-
letes or entertainers will not be adequate to make a tennis tourna-
ment a reality.
1. SECTION ONE
Under a Section One analysis, ProServ and IMG's concerted
actions may be characterized as: (1) a "division of markets" agree-
ment, where they refrain from scheduling events opposite one an-
other, and exchange the services of each other's players, and (2)
group boycotts where they do not allow their players to participate
in certain independent events in which ProServ and IMG have no
financial interest. These are traditional per se violations in light of
the relevant market of professional tennis and thus violate Section
[Vol. 4:57
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The court may determine that the industry, however, requires
a more in-depth analysis and subject these actions to the rule of
reason. In this respect, the court would have to inquire into
whether ProServ and IMG's actions provide any pro-competitive
effects which would outweigh their anti-competitive effects on the
market. Once placed into a rule of reason analysis, the court is
again functioning with few parameters due to the nature of the
sports antitrust case law. With the egregious nature of these ac-
tions, however, even a rule of reason analysis is likely to hold
ProServ and IMG's conduct illegal. This contention is supported
by recent case law where courts conduct industry inquiries as well
as pro and anti-competitive balancing tests; yet still ruling on a per
se basis.
2. SECTION TWO
Despite the claims under Section One, the main thrust of the
allegations against ProServ and IMG are the individual attacks
against them under Section Two. Prior to undertaking such an
analysis, courts must first determine whether the suspect firm pos-
sesses the requisite dominant market share to trigger Section Two.
An investigation of the two firms in the player-agent field in-
dicates that approximately eighty percent of the world's leading
men's professional tennis players are represented by either
ProServ or IMG.' 8' Additionally, ProServ and IMG also represent
the majority of junior and senior tennis players.182 In the aggre-
gate, these statistics indicate the necessary market share to pro-
ceed with a Section Two analysis. If these facts can be established
as true, the test created in U.S. v. Grinnell Corp.8 3 would be ap-
plicable. In Grinnell, the Court defined the essential elements of
monopolization as: the possession of monopoly power in the rele-
vant market, and the willful acquisition or maintenance of that
power as distinguished from growth or development as a conse-
quence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic
accident.
Applying the Grinnell test for Section Two monopolization ac-
tivities, ProServ and IMG have monopoly power in that they con-
180. E.g., United States v. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
181. Answer and Counterclaim, Volvo N. Am. Corp. v. Men's Int'l Prof. Tennis Coun-
cil, No. 85 Civ. 2959 (KTD) (S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 6, 1985), at 21.
182. Id. at 20, 22.
183. 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
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trol, in whole or in part, 24 of the 37 major Grand Prix tourna-
ments. 4 Moreover, the facts adequately illustrate that ProServ
and IMG have willfully attempted to extend their monopoly
power, a Section Two violation.
Aware that Section Two of the Sherman Act does not on its
face condemn the mere possession of monopoly power,18 5 the
courts have focused on the monopolist's purpose and intent: a pos-
itive drive to seize or exert monopoly power.18 6 Distinguishing mo-
nopolistic intent from permissible business activity is not easy
where the suspect firm possesses massive market power, because
an unlawful purpose is generally inferred from the conduct of the
monopolist. Thus, inquiry into a firm's actions must occur at two
levels: whether the conduct is in fact exclusionary, and, if it is,
whether an inference of illegal purpose and intent is justified. 8 7
It is specifically alleged that ProServ and IMG each have vio-
lated Section Two as to player representation and the television
markets as follows: (1) by offering financial guarantees and wild-
card spots (i.e., automatic qualification into a tournament) in order
to induce promising young players to sign agency contracts with
them, (2) threatening to blacklist promising young players if they
do not sign with them, (3) extending loans or other financial bene-
fits to tennis coaches to enlist their support in signing promising
young players, and (4) possessing dominant control in the other
product markets (tournaments and television rights) which further
pressures tennis players to sign with them.18 8
ProServ and IMG also violate Section Two in the tennis tour-
nament market by: (1) leveraging their star clients to obtain finan-
cial concessions from tournament owners, (2) coercing financial
concessions from tournament organizers by threatening to hold a
"special event" at the same time as their tournament, (3) acting in
concert to promote their own interests, (4) pressuring their players
to participate in tournaments from which they profit,88 and (5)
184. Answer and Counterclaim, Volvo N. Am. Corp. v. Men's Int'l Prof. Tennis Coun-
cil, No. 85 Civ. 2959 (KTD) (S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 6, 1985), at 24.
185. See P. ASCH, ECONOMIc THEORY AND THE ANTITRUST DILEMMA 240 (1970).
186. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 236 F. Supp. 244 (D.R.I. 1964), aff'd except
as to the decree, 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
187. E. GELLHORN, ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 122 (1987).
188. Complaint, Volvo N. Am. Corp. v. Men's Int'l Prof. Tennis Council, No. 85 Civ.
2959 (KTD) (S.D.N.Y filed Apr. 17, 1985), at 55-57.
189. ProServ admitted that Jimmy Connors appeared in the D. C. National Bank
Tennis Classic in 1985 (managed by ProServ) as a personal favor to Mr. Dell. Volvo had an
"understanding" that Jimmy Connors (a ProServ client) would play at Fort Myers, and
Volvo had a contract that Ivan Lendl would play there in 1986.
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scheduling their events to favor their players.
Ascertaining whether these allegations are evidence of ProServ
and IMG's attempt to monopolize the relevant market again turns
on market definition. Determining the market to be professional
tennis, the relative power of these firms in the market makes ille-
gality likely. Individually, these allegations could constitute a Sec-
tion Two violation and collectively they are tantamount to a guilty
verdict.
The most flagrant of all the Section Two violations is ProServ
and IMG's attempt to create vertical restraints through tying ar-
rangements.19 Here, ProServ and IMG use tennis players they re-
present (the tying product) to gain control of tennis tournaments
(the tied product). It is quite evident that through vertical re-
straints of competition, these two firms are attempting to parlay
their control of the component markets of player services, tennis
tournaments, and broadcasting to monopolize the entire market of
men's professional tennis. Through their control of the players,
ProServ and IMG control the smaller interrelated markets to such
a degree that their dominance of the relative market becomes
absolute.
VII. INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ISSUES
In light of the worldwide operations of all parties, it is possible
that in addition to U.S. antitrust vulnerability they may also be
open to international attack. The body of international antitrust
law is not well developed, nor is the notion of a free market uni-
formly agreed upon by the many nations. Our inexorably shrinking
world makes the marketing of truly global products a reality. As
our global economic paradigm becomes more intricate, the protec-
tion of goods and services in the international marketplace be-
comes an increasing dilemma. With respect to professional tennis,
the penetration of the world market is accepted, and thus, the pos-
sibility of antitrust violations exists on several levels. The only for-
mal body of law that may be effective in undertaking an antitrust
attack on either the Council, ProServ, or IMG is the antitrust law
of the European Economic Community (EEC).
The EEC was formed by several treaties binding the nations
190. See Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws, 72
HARV. L. REV. 50 (1959); Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power Through Leverage, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 515 (1985); Baker, The Supreme Court and the Per Se Tying Rule: Cutting
the Gordian Knot, 66 VA. L. REV. 1235 (1980).
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on the continent, culminating in the Treaty of Rome.191 The goals
of the EEC, as stated in the Treaty, are "to promote throughout
the Community a harmonious development of economic activities,
a continuous and balanced expansion, an increased stability, an ac-
celerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations be-
tween its Member States." '192
Realizing that working together for common economic goals
could lead to anti-competitive behavior, the Community included
important antitrust provisions in the Treaty, namely Articles 85
and 86."'
191. Treaty of Rome, Jan. 1, 1958, 298 U.N.T.S. 11.
192. See Treaty of Rome, Art. 2.
193. Treaty of Rome, Art. 85:
1. The following shall be deemed to be incompatible with the Common Market and shall
hereby be prohibited: any agreements between enterprises, any decisions by associations of
enterprises and any concerned practices which are likely to affect trade between the Mem-
ber States and which have as their object or result the prevention, restriction or distortion
of competition within the Common Market, in particular those consisting in:
(a) The direct or indirect fixing of purchase or selling prices or of any other trading
conditions;
(b) The limitation or control of production, markets, technical development, or investment;
(c) Market sharing or the sharing of sources of supply;
(d) The application to parties to transactions of unequal terms in respect of equivalent sup-
plies, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; or
(e) The subjecting of the conclusion of a contract to the acceptance by a party of additional
supplies which, either by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection
with the subject of such contract.
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be null and void.
3. Nevertheless, the provisions of paragraph 1 may be declared inapplicable in the case of:
-any agreement or classes of agreements between enterprises;
-any decisions or classes of decisions by associations of enterprises; and
-any concerted practices or classes of concerted practices which contribute to the improve-
ment of the production or distribution of goods or to the promotion of technical or economic
progress while reserving to users an equitable share in the profit resulting therefrom, and
which:
(a) Neither impose on the enterprises concerned any restrictions not indispensable to the
attainment of the above objectives;
(b) Nor enable such enterprises to eliminate competition in respect of a substantial propor-
tion of the goods concerned.
Art. 86 provides:
To the extent to which trade between any Member States may be affected thereby,
action by one or more enterprises to take improper advantage of a dominant position within
the Common Market or within a substantial part of it shall be deemed to be incompatible
with the Common Market and shall hereby be prohibited. Such improper practices may, in
particular, consist in:
(a) the direct or indirect imposition of any inequitable purchase or selling prices or of
any other inequitable trading conditions;
(b) the limitation of production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of
consumers;
(c) the application to parties to transactions of unequal terms in respect of equivalent
supplies, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; or
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Application of these provisions to the parties would not aid
interests outside of the EEC, such as tournament owners in the
United States, because these articles have never been construed to
protect non-EEC resident entities.' However, many of the re-
straints caused by Council activity directly affect EEC interests,
such as private tournament owners in Europe. While the antitrust
provisions of the Treaty of Rome do not prohibit the formation of
cartels or monopolies, they do prohibit the abuse of concentrated
economic power.195 Therefore, the parties may not abuse their po-
sition as a cartel and remain in compliance with EEC antitrust
law. However, it is impossible for the parties to meet this obliga-
tion. ProServ effectively controls 100 percent of the tennis market
within the EEC. This places ProServ in what the European Court
of Justice of the European Communities would call a position of
market dominance. The Court has recently indicated that an or-
ganization controlling a mere forty percent share of the market can
be considered dominant.' 96 Therefore, any anti-competitive actions
committed by ProServ would be held in violation of the Treaty.
The likelihood of using EEC antitrust laws'97 to thwart abuses
by ProServ, however, is lessened by the leniency the European
Commission and the European Court have demonstrated towards
activities which they feel have enhanced "intra-member trade and
fortune." It is possible, however, that as tennis trade in Europe
increases, these bodies will hold that the EEC's goal of economic
growth will be better served by a stronger stance against ProServ's
anti-competitive actions.
Beyond the EEC, there are few, if any, antitrust proscriptions
in operation on the world market. An international antitrust ac-
cord, however, should be developed by the United Nations, similar
to the draft principles of its Committee on Trade and Develop-
ment which facilitate control of restrictive business practices. 198 An
excellent enforcement mechanism for such principles would be the
International Court of Justice. However, because many of the con-
(d) the subjecting of the conclusion of a contract to the acceptance, by a party, of addi-
tional supplies which, either by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no con-
nection with the subject of such contract.
194. See A. CRO'I'rT, TRADING UNDER EEC AND U. S. ANTITRUST LAWS (1977).
195. See Myers, EEC Antitrust Law: Its Development and Philosophy with Special
Attention to Intellectual Property Rights, 5 N.C.J. INT'L. AND CoM. REG. 41 (1979).
196. United Brands Co. v. Commission of the European Communities, 21 COMMON
MKT. L. REV. 429 (1978).
197. Myers, EEC Antitrust Law, supra note 195, at 46.
198. See A. HERMANN, CONFLICTS OF NATIONAL LAWS WITH INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
ACTIVITY: ISSUES OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY, BRITISH-NORTH AMERICAN COMMITTEE 56 (1982).
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flicts which would arise under such an international antitrust ac-
cord would involve transnational enterprises, there should also be
United Nations legislation which grants multinational corporations
standing before the court, a right which presently only sovereign
nations presently enjoy.
VIII. CONFLICT OF INTERESTS
Above and beyond the antitrust attacks upon ProServ and
IMG, the Council raised allegations of gross conflicts of interest.
This claim stems from the pervasive reach of ProServ and IMG,
wherein they represent players, function as their attorneys, own
and manage tournaments, and broadcast those tournaments.
As attorney/agents also involved in the business dealings of
their principles, ProServ and IMG are open to attack under the
American Bar Association Code of Professional Conduct (Code).
Canon Five of the Code requires that an attorney exercise indepen-
dent judgment on behalf of a client.199 The Code's ethical consider-
ations implement Canon Five's directive that an attorney exercise
his professional judgment "solely for the benefit of his client...
free of compromising influences and loyalties."200 In order to avoid
a conflict of interests,
[a] lawyer should not accept proffered employment if his per-
sonal interests or desires will ... affect adversely the advice to
be given or services rendered the prospective client .... [A]
lawyer carefully should refrain from . . . assuming a position
that would tend to make his judgment less protective of the in-
terests of his client.20 1
The Code's disciplinary rules back up the ethical considera-
tions with standards by which the attorney's conduct will be mea-
sured if his conduct is questioned. Disciplinary Rule 5-103 forbids
an attorney from acquiring a "proprietary interest in the cause of
action or subject matter of litigation he is conducting for a cli-
ent. ' 2 2 Rule 5-104 requires full disclosure and client consent to
any matter in which the attorney has "differing interests" to those
199. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 5 (1980).
200. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-1 (1980). See also Grievance
Comm. v. Ratner, 152 Conn. 59, 203 A.2d 82 (Conn. 1964), where the court held that a client
"is entitled to feel that, until that business [that the attorney has been retained to handle]
is finally disposed of in some manner, he has the undivided loyalty of the one upon whom he
looks as his advocate and champion." 152 Conn. at 62, 203 A.2d at 84.
201. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-2 (1980).
202. Id. DR 5-103(A).
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of his client. 03 If an attorney/agent were the owner of a tennis
tournament and the legal representative of players therein, it
would appear unlikely that EC 5-2 (or more importantly, DR 5-103
and 104) could still be met.
It is important to realize that where an attorney/agent repre-
sents numerous interests involved in competitive events, the likeli-
hood of favoritism and thus selective application of the "best ef-
forts" rule increases. 2°  In essence, the attorney/agent invites
violations of Canons 5 and 7205 when he represents so many inter-
ests that he cannot provide proper representation for any of them.
Most important is the duty to avoid "even the appearance of
professional impropriety." '  The attorney/agent should appear to
the public, as well as his clients, as willing and able to represent
the individual client while not injuring or ignoring any other client.
Where the attorney/agent obtains or possesses the power to exert
significant influence in the marketplace, the appearance of impro-
priety may exist. For example, owners of Council-sanctioned
Grand Prix tournaments are allowed to select players to fill "wild-
card" spots in the tournament draw. This is intended to provide
flexibility to owners, allowing top-ranked juniors to compete and
otherwise benefit the sport. If the attorney/tournament owner uses
the wild card for his own benefit (e.g., to lure a potential client)
rather than the benefit of his existing clients, he has violated the
203. Id. DR 5-104(A). See also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT rule 1.7(b)
(1980):
A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be
materially limited .. .by the lawyer's own interests, unless
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely af-
fected; and
(2) the client consents after consultation. When representation of multiple cli-
ents in a single matter is undertaken, the consultation shall include explanation
of the implications of the common representation and the advantages and risks
involved.
Id. (emphasis added). Both conflict of interests rules impose the same strict test: if an attor-
ney's representation may be materially limited by prior interests, he should not represent a
new client. If a reasonable belief exists that the multiple representation will not adversely
affect the client, and the client gives consent after being fully informed, then the rule will
not be offended. See Maryland St. Bar Ass'n Committee on Ethics, Informal Opinion 82-45,
801 Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 4319 (1982); State Bar of Michigan Commit-
tee on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Informal Opinion CI-584, 801 Law. Man. on Prof.
Conduct (ABA/BNA) 4814 (1980).
204. In any given tennis event, ProServ or IMG will usually represent many tennis
players. The likeliness is great that their capacity as tournament managers as well will result
in some manner of favoritism for one of their athletes.
205. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 5 requires the attorney to
exert best efforts on behalf of a client, while Canon 7 mandates zealous representation.
206. Id., Canon 9.
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interests of his existing client and clearly given the appearance of
impropriety to the public.
The attorney who is simultaneously an agent for players and
the owner of a tournament in which they play is inviting conflicts
of interest."" In response to this dilemma, the Council promul-
gated the conflict of interest rule scheduled to take effect in De-
cember, 1989.08
On one hand, the regulation can be viewed as an attempt by
the Council to restrict competition among or between sports
agency firms such as ProServ or IMG. This is essentially the posi-
tion taken by these firms. On the other hand, the regulation can be
seen as a mere recitation of the existing agency and antitrust law,
promulgated for the good of the sport and necessitated only by the
failure of certain sports agents to voluntarily abide thereby. 0 9 This
is the position of the Council. Because the regulation would require
agent/tournament owners to choose between the two alternatives,
something that ProServ is apparently unwilling to do, both sports
agency firms have contested the regulation in court.
This action in itself raises the most blatant conflict of interest
issue yet. Ostensibly, the regulation is designed to allow more play-
ers access to more tournaments, and thus, more prize money
within the marketplace for their services. The regulation was ap-
proved by the player's representatives who also comprise one-third
of the Council. ProServ and IMG, therefore, are contesting a regu-
lation which was approved by and benefits the very players whose
"best interests" they supposedly represent. This inconsistency vio-
lates not only any attorney/client relationships that may exist, but
also appears to violate the athlete/agent relationship as defined by
Detroit Lions and Billy Sims v. Argovitz. 1 °
Normally, a fiduciary duty is created by an undertaking to act
primarily for another's benefit, in matters connected with such un-
207. In no manner may either ProServ or IMG allege that they are not representing
their athletes in their capacity as attorneys. An alibi to this effect is fruitless.
208. See MIPTC Yearbook, supra note 6, at Supplement No. 1:
Prohibited Conflicts. No Player Agent shall be a Tournament Owner, Defacto Tournament
Owner or Tournament Manager/Director for any MIPTC sanctioned tournament. No tour-
nament in violation of this Article shall be sanctioned by the MIPTC and any tournament
sanctioned by the MIPTC that is later found to be in violation of the Article shall have such
sanction withdrawn.
209. ProServ and IMG have seemingly blinded themselves to the reality of the laws
regarding their actions, and believe that due to their powerful position, their actions are
valid.
210. 580 F. Supp. 542 (E.D. Mich. 1984).
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dertaking2 1' A sports agent has a fiduciary duty to the athlete, re-
quiring loyalty, good faith, and fair, honest dealing by the agent.212
This duty requires that the agent not have a personal financial
stake that conflicts with the interests of the athlete. "Once it has
been shown that an agent had an interest in a transaction involv-
ing his principal [and] antagonistic to the principal's interest,
fraud on the part of the agent is presumed. '1 S
Where an agent is an owner or operator of a tournament in
which his client/athlete competes, the presumption of fraud rears
its head. Where the agent/owner then seeks redress in the courts to
protect his already questionable status as both agent and owner,
the application of the Argovitz presumption is inescapable.
Interestingly, the Council's regulation is in actuality nothing
more than a precise application of Argovitz to the tennis world. As
such, it should be moot, because the law should already require
ProServ and IMG to refrain from conflicts of interest and/or anti-
trust violations. Apparently, the existing law was an insufficient
deterrent, and an economic sanction (the Council regulation) was
required to make ProServ and IMG toe the line. Instead of capitu-
lating, ProServ and IMG have asserted that the regulation (and
thus the existing law) impinges on their right to compete and oper-
ate freely in the marketplace. This in itself can be interpreted as
an expression of excessive monopolistic power. More surprisingly,
ProServ and IMG argue that this regulation, designed to prevent
conflicts of interest, is in fact a restraint on their ability to com-
pete. This position, when viewed concomitantly with the necessity
of the regulation as an economic application of the existing law, is
virtually an admission by ProServ and IMG of their market power.
The conclusion that Section Two has been violated is inescapable.
IX. CONCLUSION
To date, sports antitrust courts have failed to implement a
proper antitrust analysis when examining the validity of league
rules. Recent cases, including L.A. Coliseum, fall short on several
fronts when applying the Sherman Act to sports industries. The
courts fail to consider the relevant market in a proper fashion, in
that they do not place the market determination in the linchpin
position as they should. This is due in great part to the failure of
courts to ascertain the relevant market of a professional sport, in
211. Id. at 547.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 548.
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the context of competition with other similar professional sports.
Rather, they apply the improper determination of intra-league eco-
nomic competition.
These imperfect market definitions are utilized by the courts
when undertaking both Section One and Two analyses, and when
considering the existence of a single entity. The confusion created
by this ill-applied bedrock determination results in a legal house of
cards. Anticipating the impending collapse, a new model is offered,
with the hope that such an analytical application to and determi-
nation of a CSA, will suggest a clear and sounder approach to
sports antitrust cases.
The status of the Council, ProServ, and IMG is difficult to de-
termine in light of the confused state of current antitrust law after
wading through the sea of antitrust considerations. It appears the
Council and its conflict of interest rules will stand. The validity of
the Council's Commitment Agreement is far less certain and in
fact they are highly suspect. Though they are likely to fall, the Bo-
nus Pool may possibly withstand the attack. Alternatively, under a
classic corporate antitrust analysis, ProServ and IMG seem to be
very vulnerable. It is surprising the Justice Department has failed
to inquire into these apparently blatant violations.
In the final analysis, only such a powerful antitrust problem,
as that found within professional tennis, would unearth the weak-
nesses in such a well developed body of case law. Many years from
now, jurisprudential leaders will look back upon the quagmire
which engulfs current sports antitrust and recognize that only
through the piercing nature of a critical analysis could reform and
improvement have been possible. By exposing these misplaced le-
gal doctrines and offering a solution, it is hoped that enough fire-
power is supplied to achieve the whole-shift needed to free this
bound paradigm, setting it upon a fresh course - conceived in a
progressive vision, unchained by historical baggage, and firmly
placed in a proper framwork to allow for a natural evolution.
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